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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ARNOLD MACHINERY COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
CLIFFORD A. PRINCE, dba 
PRINCE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY 
and WESTERN SURETY COMPANY, 
INC, a corporation 
Defendants-Respondents. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
WESTERN SURETY COMPANY, INC. 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action brought by the Arnold Machinery 
Company to recover, under a rental agreement, rental and 
attorney's fees, arising out of the rental of earth moving 
equipment from a sub-contractor on a federal government 
project and its bonding company. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
In July of 1975, both the plaintiff-appellant and 
Case No. 14337 
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the defendant-respondent filed motions for summary judgment. 
Plaintiff-appellant, Arnold Machinery's motion was for a par-
tial summary judgment, not including the question of damages. 
Defendant, Western Surety's Motion was for a full summary judg-
ment. Both motions were argued on August 12, 1975 before 
the Honorable Bryant H. Croft. On August 26, 1975, Judge 
Croft handed down a memorandum decision granting Western 
Surety Company's motion for summary judgment and denying 
Arnold Machinery's motion. (R. 73, 74 and 75). An Order 
and Summary Judgment was signed on September 16, 1975 by 
Judge Croft (R. 76 and 77). 
Thereafter, the plaintiff Arnold Machinery filed 
an Amended Complaint, pursuant to a stipulation with counsel 
for the defendant Clifford A. Prince, dba Prince Construction 
Company; in which allegations against Western Surety continued 
to be present. On the 30th day of October, 1975, the plaintiff 
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment against Clifford A. Prince, 
dba Prince Construction Company, and the same was granted, 
and a judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff and against 
Clifford A. Prince for the rental and attorney's fee, after 
hearing on November 12, 1975. Plaintiff Arnold Machinery 
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seeks a reversal of Judge Croft's Order Granting Summary 
Judgment in favor of Western Surety against Arnold Machinery 
Company. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent, Western Surety Company seeks an affir-
mance of the Order of the District Court granting summary 
judgment in favor of the defendant-respondent, Western Surety 
Company, or in the alternative, a ruling that the plaintiff-
appellant's only action is in the Feberal Courts. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff first commenced its action on the 31st 
day of October, 1974, in the United States District Court 
for the District of Utah, Central Division in Case No. C-75-337. 
That action was entitled United States of America for the use 
and benefit of Arnold Machinery Company, Inc., a corporation, 
Plaintiff, vs. Clifford A. Prince dba Prince Construction 
Company, R. D. Tolman Construction Company, Inc., a Utah 
corporation; Western Surety Company, Inc., a corporation; and 
Transamerica Insurance Company, Defendants. Answers were filed 
by all defendants. In the Complaint in that action it was 
I 
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alleged that: "The last material was furnished on October 
30, 1973." In that action Tolman cross-claimed against 
Western Surety on its bond written JJI favor of Tolman bonding 
Clifford A. Prince, dba Prince Construction Company. Approxi-
mately seven (7) months later, on the 22nd day of May, 1975, 
that case was dismissed, without prejudice, upon a stipulation 
and agreement of all counsel. On the 19th day of May, 1975, 
plaintiff initiated this action in the Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah; not including the previous 
defendants R. D. Tolman Construction Company and the 
Transamerica Insurance Company. 
The R. C. Tolman Construction Company was the general 
contractor for the construction of the Fish Lake Sanitation 
System for the U. S. Forest Service at Fish Lake, Utah. As 
such, it was involved in construction of a roadway in lagoons 
on federal lands and subject to the requirements of the Miller 
Act, 40 USCA 270 (a). Clifford A. Prince, dba Prince 
Construction Company was a sub-contractor on the project in 
the heavy equipment and earth moving area. (See paragraphs 
1, 2 and 3 of Complaint, R. 2, Paragraph 1 of the Answer to 
Complaint of Prince, R. 6 and Answer to Request for Admissions 
of Prince, R. 48 and 49.) 
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Tolman, as general contractor for a construction 
project on federal lands and for the United States Government 
was required by the Miller Act, supra., to furnish a performance 
and payments bond to the United States of America. That bond 
was involved in the earlier action in the Federal Court, 
though that aspect of the action was dropped when the instant 
case was filed. Tolman by its sub-contract required Prince 
to supply Tolman with a contract bond, which it did through 
the Western Surety Company. A copy of that bond is on file 
with the Court attached to the affidavit of John W. Lowe 
(R. 42, 43 and 44). That bond makes Prince, as principal, 
and the Western Surety Company, as surety, "firmly bound unto 
R. C. Tolman Construction Company, Inc., 130 North 600 East, 
Centerville, Utah, hereinafter called the obligee, . . . ." 
Western Surety Company is bound to Tolman, and Tolman alone 
is listed as and called the "Obligee". 
Arnold Machinery, in its Complaint, alleged that 
Prince Construction rented equipment from Arnold Machinery 
and failed or refused to pay the agreed rental price* Arnold 
provided such equipment, or materials up to and through 
October 30, 1973. See plaintiff's Request for Admissions, 
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and the Answers thereto (R. 48 and 49) . The Complaint in 
this action was filed more than a year and a half thereafter, 
on the 19th of May, 1975. 
After some discovery, the plaintiff, Arnold Machinery 
made a motion for partial summary judgment and the defendant 
Western Surety made a motion for summary judgment. Plain-
tiff's motion was based on its assertion that the action was 
not limited by a one year limitation, that the state courts 
have proper jurisdiction and that Arnold was a third-party 
beneficiary on the bond and therefore a real party in 
interest. 
Both parties filed memoranda in support of their 
positions. Western Surety argued that the Arnold Machinery 
Company's claim was barred on three (3) grounds. Its memo-
randum set those forth as follows: 
In the first place the defendant, Western 
Surety contends that the action must be brought 
in the Federal Court. Secondly, the cause of 
action of the plaintiff is barred, even by 
} state law. Thirdly, the bond in question, 
which was made a part of the record, runs 
to the Tolman Construction Company for the 
purpose of reimbursing it for any losses 
it sustained as a result of a claim by material-
men or laborers". (R. 56) 
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Arnold Machinery Company responded to each of those points 
in a reply memorandum. Oral arguments were held before the 
Court on the 12th of August, 1975, and a Memorandum Decision 
was handed down by Judge Bryant H. Croft on August 26, 1975 
(R. 73, 74 and 75). The Court's Memorandum Decision read 
as follows: 
The Court has under advisement plaintiff's 
motion for partial summary judgment and defendant 
Western's motion for summary judgment which 
motions were argued on August 12, 1975 with 
appearances as above indicated. Plaintiff's 
motion is based upon the contentions that the 
only issue remaining to be tried is what damages 
are owing. Defendant Western contends the action 
is barred by the one year statute of limitations 
as well as the Miller Act. 
Under Section 270 (b) of Title 40 USCA, 
it is apparent that parties furnishing mat-
erials on a job covered by the Miller Act, 
whether they be subcontractors or suppliers 
to subcontractors, have a right of action on 
the bond required by that Act. If their 
rights under the act are asserted pursuant 
to that statute, then the action must be 
filed in the federal court within the time 
required by that statute. However, the 
Miller Act does not make action under that 
statute the exclusive remedy to a material 
or labor claim for materials or services 
furnished on a federal project and if an 
unpaid materialman or laborer chooses not 
to sue under the act on the bond required 
by the United States on a federal project, 
he loses the benefit of the act and the pro-
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tection of the bond required by the federal 
government but not his claim or remedy un-
less otherwise barred. Thus, the Miller 
Act is no bar to plaintiff's complaint and 
its one year statute of limitations is not 
applicable. 
Plaintiff alleges that the state 
Mechanic's Lien laws (sec. 28-1-1 et seq.) 
are not applicable because Section 1 thereof 
specifically provides that its provisions do 
not apply to any public building, structure 
or improvement and this case involves a pub-
lic improvement. Plaintiff further contends 
that Chapter 2 of Title 14 dealing with 
mechanic's and materialmen's liens on pri-
vate contract does not apply because defendant 
Prince is not an owner but was a contractor; 
and that Chapter 1 of said Title relating to 
public contracts is not applicable because 
the project did not involve furnishing work 
for the state or any of its political sub-
divisions. Plaintiff thus contends that the 
six year statute of limitations relating to 
written contracts is controlling and that 
the action may be maintained, or that the 
four or three year statutes could apply in-
stead of the one year statute set forth in 
Section 14-2-2. 
It is my opinion that the fact that the 
bond required of Prince was by the general con-
tractor Tolman, rather than by the "owner" of 
the land does not take the contract outside of 
the scope of Chapter 2, Title 14, and that con-
tractors, sureties, materialmen and laborers 
all are bound to meet the requirements of 
sec. 14-2-1 et seq. including that of commencing 
the action within one year from the date the 
last materials were furnished or the labor 
performed. 
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This plaintiff has not done and its motion 
for partial summary judgment is denied except 
as otherwise indicated with respect to the 
applicability of the Miller Act, and defendant 
Western's motion for summary judgment of dis-
missal is granted. 
The Court, based upon that Memorandum Decision, 
entered an Order and Judgment granting Western Surety's Motion 
for Summary Judgment and denying the plaintiff's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment (R. 76). 
ARGUMENT 
Defendant Western Surety in this action contends that 
a number of issues interrelate in the determination of the proper 
forum and of the proper statute of limitations for the case. 
Defendant Western further contends that the relief sought by 
the plaintiff on this appeal is inappropriate. 
Because of the nature of the arrangement between the 
parties, both involved in this suit and previously involved with 
the bond, the nature of the relationship between the parties 
to the suit is one which does fall under the controlling purview 
of the Federal Miller Act and it is further one which is bound 
by a one year statute of limitations regardless of its 
jurisdictional base. Western Surety will herein demonstrate 
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how the bond applies and, in turn, how relevant statutes 
control the situation that thus exists. 
POINT I 
THE RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL BY THE APPELLANT IS 
INAPPROPRIATE. 
After the Western Surety Company was granted its 
Summary Judgment, the plaintiff, pursuant to a stipulation 
(R. 80), filed an AMENDED COMPLAINT (R. 81 and 82). There-
after the plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment against 
the defendant Clifford A. Prince with supportive memoranda 
and affidavits. That Motion for Summary Judgment was granted 
and signed November 12, 1975 (R. 102). 
The defendant Western Surety Company was not a party 
to the Amended Complaint nor was it a party to the summary 
judgment granted by the Court in favor of the plaintiff 
against the defendant Clifford A. Prince. 
Now, the appellant contends that the amounts found 
by the Court in that respect should be imposed against the 
defendant Western Surety Company, in spite of the fact that 
the Western Surety Company was not a party, at that point in 
time to the proceedings. 
-10-
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The Amended Complaint includes references to a 
credit memorandum which included offsets due to the defendant 
Prince. It had not yet been established or determined the 
nature of those offsets^ the project they are attributable to 
or whether or not they fall under the purview of the bond in 
question. Additionally, it is the position of the Western 
Surety Company that attorney's fees against the Western Surety 
Company would be inappropriate. 
Therefore, should the Court decide in favor of the 
appellant on the appeal, Western Surety Company would respect-
fully submit that the matter should be remanded to the trial 
court for determination on the issues between the parties 
which were unresolved at the time of the granting of the 
defendant Western Surety's Motion for Summary Judgment. At 
that point in time, the plaintiff had not made a full Motion 
for Summary Judgment. The question of damages was not a part 
of the plaintiff's Motion, and was specifically excluded. 
POINT II 
THE BOND IN QUESTION RUNS TO THE TOLMAN CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY FOR THE PURPOSE OF REIMBURSING IT? FOR LOSSES IT MIGHT 
SUSTAIN AS A RESULT OF CLAIMS BY MATERIALMEN OR LABORERS 
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OP THE DEFENDANT CLIFFORD A. PRINCE. l 
It is the position of the Western Surety Company that 
the characterization of the bond set forth in appellant's 
Statement of Facts is not entirely accurate. The bond does 
not guarantee "that Prince, as sub-contractor, would 'promptly 
pay all persons supplying labor or materials'"# The language 
of the bond itself is controlling and it is available in the 
record (R. 43). The bond provides that Clifford A. Prince and 
the Western Surety Company "are held and firmly bound unto 
R. C. Tolman Company, Inc., 130 North 600 East, Centerville, 
Utah, hereinafter called the Obligee, . . . " The bond goes 
on to further provide: 
Now, therefore, the condition of this 
obligation is such, that if the said Princi-
pal (Prince) shall faithfully perform said 
contract and indemnify the said Obligee from 
v
 any loss, as resulting from the breech of any 
of the terms and conditions thereof and 
shall promptly pay all persons supplying 
labor or material in the prosecution of the 
work provided for in such contract, then 
this obligation shall be void, otherwise 
to remain in full force and effect. 
The Principal (Prince) agreed to "indemnify the 
said Obligee (Tolman) for losses Tolman might sustairi'. Tolman 
as the appellant's brief correctly sets forth was required by 
-12-
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the Miller Act, 40 USCA 270 (a), to furnish a performance and 
a payments bond to the United States of America, which Tolman 
furnished. Under that bond, and provisions of the Miller Act, 
a cause of action was afforded to laborers and materialmen 
that would properly and timely assert their claims. The 
plaintiff in this action did not timely file such a claim. 
The purpose of the bond running from Prince and Western Surety 
to Tolman was for the purpose of indemnifying Tolman and its 
bonding company for any losses incurred by virtue of its Miller 
Act obligations. 
The appellant admits on page 3 of its brief that 
"the action was commenced slightly more than one year after 
the termination of the rental agreement". Thus, the claims 
against Tolman and Tolman's bonding company, under the Miller 
Act, have been abandoned. The plaintiff-appellant now attempts, 
through a legal subterfuge, to effectuate a bond recovery in 
spite of its admitted non-compliance with statutory filing 
requirements. 
(Point of Fact. The action which was "commenced 
slightly more than one year after the termination of the 
rental agreement" was the action in the federal court. It 
was commenced one day after the one year termination. This 
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state court action was commenced lh months after the termi-
nation of the rental agreement.) 
Under the terms of the bond, Tolman was the obligee 
and Tolman could recover against Clifford A. Prince and the 
Western Surety Company. The plaintiff-appellant missed their 
opportunity to recover against Tolman and its bonding company 
under the Miller Act. Thus, the obligee (Tolman) has no 
loss for which it needs to be indemnified. If Arnold had 
properly and timely commenced its claim (which it did not) 
Tolman would have had a loss for which it could legitimately 
and properly seek indemnification under the provisions of the 
bond. 
The bond in this instance runs only to the obligee, 
Tolman. It is unlike the bonds found in the case of Oscar E. 
Chytraus Company, Inc. vs. Wasatch Furnace and Electric, Inc., 
28 Utah 2d 339, 502 P.2d 554 (1972) which ran to "the owner 
and to all other persons as their interests may appear"? and 
it is also different from the bond in Steel Components Company 
vs. United States Fidelity and Guarantee Company, 28 Utah 2d 
25, 497 P.2d 646 (1972), which bond was for the protection 
of persons supplying labor or material to the contractor or 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
his sub-contractor. 
As is pointed out in the brief of the appellant, 
Tolman in this instance was required by the Miller Act to 
make provisions for the protection of materialmen and laborers 
by the filing of a Miller Act qualifying bond. The function 
here being performed was to provide a remedy for materialmen 
and suppliers in an area where mechanics1 lien remedies were 
applicable. In the 1973 Utah case of Carlisle vs. Cox, 29 Utah 
2d 136, 506 P.2d 60, the Court reasserted an observation made 
in an earlier case (Rio Grande Lumber Company vs. Darke, 50 
Utah 114, 167 P. 241 (1917) ) and observed that the bonding 
statute tied in with the mechanics' lien law. In the Carlisle 
case the Court stated as follows: 
In Rio Grande Lumber Company vs. Darke 
this court observed that the bonding statute 
was an auxiliary to the mechanics' lien law 
and an integral part thereof and could have been 
incorporated in the same chapter. 
Section 38-1-7, U.C.A. 1953, (Mechanics' 
Liens) provides: 
. . . every person other than 
the original contractor claiming 
the benefit of this chapter within 
sixty days after furnishing the 
last material or performing the 
last labor . . . must file for 
record . . . a claim in writing . . . . 
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Both Section 14-2-2 and 38-1-7 provide . 
that certain affirmative actions must be 
taken to preserve and enforce the statutory 
claims thereunder within a requisite period 
after the last material was furnished or 
labor performed. 
Tolman provided the plaintiff-appellant with an 
appropriate bonding remedy. The plaintiff-appellant failed 
to properly take advantage of that remedy. Now they are 
trying to avail themselves of a secondary and independent 
bond which Tolman had provided for itself should should the 
plaintiff-appellant or other materialmen properly avail them-
selves of the Miller Act bond Tolman had set up. 
Appellant, in its brief, on page 19 cites the case 
of Deluxe Glass Company vs. Martin, et al., 116 Utah 144, 208 
P.2d 1127 (1949) in supporting the proposition that a material-
man may sue the surety directly. The Deluxe Glass case 
construed a particular bond and construed that the bond, by 
virtue of its language, applied to the given situation in 
that case. However, that bond was a bond of a general con-
tractor given to an owner of land. That situation is akin 
to the circumstance and the result bond which Toleman, as 
general contractor, had to provide the United States of 
America. Additionally, the Utah Supreme Court in the Deluxe 
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Glass case, at page 151, made the following statement: 
It follows that should the owner be 
required to pay the debts in question, the 
surety would be liable under the bond to 
the owner in precisely the amount which 
it is, by judgment below, required to pay 
the creditors. 
Thus, the Court considered the situation under which a remedy 
was available by the materialmen directly against the owner 
and the owner, by virtue thereof, having a remedy back 
against the bond of the contractor. In the instant case, 
the materialman has no claim against Tolman and Tolman has 
no claim against Prince or the Western Surety Company. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S ONLY REMEDY, AS AGAINST BOND 
COVERAGE, EXISTED IN THE FEDERAL COURTS UNDER THE FEDERAL 
MILLER ACT. 
Plaintiff admits in its brief that the project being 
worked upon was a United States Forest Service Project. 
Plaintiff further admits that Tolman as prime contractor 
was required by the Miller Act to furnish a performance and 
payment bond to the United States. Under the provisions of 
the Miller Act, 40 USCA 270 (a), the plaintiff-appellant 
-17-
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had a clear opportunity to avail itself of statutorily 
required bond coverage. Plaintiff-appellant in its brief 
admits that it failed to comply with the requirements of such 
coverage. As such, it is the opinion of the defendant-respondent 
that the plaintiff-appellants have missed their opportunity. 
In the case of Glens Falls Indemnity Company vs. 
The United States of America for the use of Westinghouse 
Electric Supply Company, 229 F.2d 370 (9th Cir., 1955) 
portions of which are found at R. 70, 71 and 72, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit ruled that in an 
action by an electrical materialman against a sub-contractor 
and a contractor and their bonding company that the material-
man's proper remedy was against the contractor and its 
surety and the surety's proper remedy, in turn, was against 
the sub-contractor and its surety. Judgment was rendered in 
favor of the supplier against the prime contractor and its 
sureties and further in favor of the prime contractor against 
the sub-contractor and its sureties. 
See also 117 ALR 663, annotation—subcontractors 
bonds—sureties liabilities, wherein it states as follows: 
As a general rule it may be stated 
that if the sub-contractors' bond is con-
ditioned for the indemnification of the 
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contractor for any claim of damage for 
which the principle contractor may be held 
liable and for the payment of which the 
sub-contractor is primarily liable, would 
seem that liability exists on the part 
of the surety on the bond of the sub-
contractor to indemnify the principle con-
tractor against any liability which may 
be imposed upon him or to reimburse him 
for any payment he may be required to make, 
in respect of labor and materials furnished 
to the sub-contractor. At page 663. 
The 1954 New York case of Mcgrath vs. American Surety Company 
of New York, 122 N.E. 2d 906, held that the object of a 
bond given by a sub-contractor to indemnify a general con-
tractor from liability imposed upon him by the Miller Act 
for non-performance and non-payment by the sub-contractor was 
to protect the general contractor, and not to enlarge the 
materialmen who were adequately protected under the Miller 
Act, and that, as such, a materialman had no right of action 
against such a sub-contractors' bond. In that decision, the 
Court of Appeals for New York stated as follows: 
If the order appealed from were correct, 
it would mean that the contractor and sub-
contractor considered that the laborers 
and materialmen of the sub-contractor were 
not sufficiently protected by the Miller 
Act, and consequently set out to enlarge 
their rights by the procurement of the 
additional bond in suit. That is manifestly 
not what occurred. The rights of these 
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laborers and materialmen of the sub-contractor 
were definitely fixed and considered to be 
protected adequately by the Miller Act, 
The object in giving the bond in suit was 
to protect the contractor against this 
very liability imposed upon him by Federal 
Law. 
This conclusion is not altered by the 
circumstance that the bond upon which the 
action is based is conditioned upon payment 
by the sub-contractor of its obligations 
to laborers and materialmen. This condition 
merely describes the events in which the 
general contractor would have recourse 
to the bond, if it were harassed by losses 
due to neglect of the sub-contractor to 
satisfy these obligations. 
The Court went on to discuss the intention of the 
parties to the sub-contractor's bond and determined that it 
was "inconsistent with an intention that the plaintiff and 
others in like position should have right to sue upon it. 
If that intention is absent, the right to sue will be denied". 
The New York Court determined that the Miller Act remedy was 
the only remedy available to the materialmen in this instance 
and that the purpose of the bond given by the sub-contractor 
to the contractor was totally distinct. The Court so stated as 
follows: 
The object in having a separate pay-
ment bond—the one in suit—was to protect 
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the general contractor against the contin-
gency which would arise if the sub-contractor's 
performance bond were to become exhausted 
in completing the construction work thereby 
leaving the general contractor exposed to 
liability under the Miller Act to unpaid 
laborers or materialmen of the sub-contractor 
without indemnification. 
It is the view of the defendant-respondent Western Surety 
Company that the fact situation in the McGrath case, supra, 
is extremely simular to the situation presently before the 
Court in the instant case. 
An example of this proper functioning under the 
Miller Act can be found in a United States Supreme Court 
case of Southern Construction Company, Inc. vs. United States 
for the use of Samuel J. Pickard, 371 U.S. 57, 9 L.2d 31, 
83 S.Ct. 108 (1962). in that case a supplier of the materials 
made claims against a prime contractor and his surety the 
Continental Casualty Company. They paid the claims of the 
materialmen and thereafter properly asserted those paid amounts 
in a counter-claim against the sub-contractor. 
Another clear example of this proper procedure under 
the Miller Act can be found in the 1958 case of St. Paul Mercury 
Indemnity Company vs. Wright Contracting Company, (5th Cir.) 
250 F.2d 758. In that case a prime contractor on a road con-
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struction contract involving highways and public works, paid 
a processed bond claim. Thereafter, the contractor, and not 
the materialman filed suit against the bonding company of the 
now defunct and bankrupt contractor. The court there held 
that the contractors claim was properly brought against the 
bonding company of the sub-contractor as the bond of the sub-
contractor made the general contractor the obligee and as the 
general contractor had suffered a loss in that it was previously 
obligated to honor the claim of the materialman. 
The bond in question herein like those in the Federal 
Cases cited above, was designed to protect the contractor. 
It was to give him a remedy over against the sub-contractor, 
through indemnification (as specifically provided in the bond 
language) should a laborer or materialman properly and timely 
bring an action against the contractor and its surety under 
the Miller Act. In this case, Tolman has no need to be 
indemnified as the plaintiff-appellant Arnold Machinery Company 
did not properly bring its Miller Act claim. 
POINT IV 
THE CAUSE OF ACTION OF THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT IS 
BARRED BY THE ONE YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
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Appellent's brief in this matter essentially takes 
the position that nothing applies to this fact situation. He 
contends that the Miller Act does not apply, Mechanics' Lien 
laws do not apply, and all other bond laws do not apply. 
Counsel for the appellant apparently takes the position that 
we here have a bond which is not a bond. Accordingly, he 
argues that none of the many bond juiuuuLiti^ , existant under 
the law, are of any weight. 
The appellant again cites the case, in its brief 
of Rader vs. Manufacturers Casualty Insurance Company of 
Philadelphia, 242 F.2d 419, (2nd Cir. 1957). That case is 
not in point. At no point in that case is there any reference 
to the Miller Act. The situation that existed in that case is 
strongly divergent from Miller Act situations. The purpose of 
the Miller Act is to provide suppliers of labor and materials 
a remedy. It is so because no mechanics' lien is allowed 
against Federal Government Property, The laborer or material-
man gives up his right to establish such a mechanics' lien 
in favor of the surety provisions imposed by the Miller Act. 
A point of distinction in the Rader case is whether or not the 
surety and indemnity "inured to the benefit of the United States". 
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That question is not the question which is before the Court 
concerning the applicability of bonds under the Miller Act. 
Citing the Rader case as the plaintiff does disregards sub-
stantial additional portions of federal practice and procedure. 
The appellant in this brief has also quickly and 
cursorily discarded the significance of the Mechanics1 Lien 
Act mentioned above. In the Carlisle vs. Cox case, supra., the 
Utah Supreme Court in 1973 observed that bonding statutes 
are auxiliary to the mechanics' lien law and an integral part 
thereof. Indeed the Court states that the bonding statute 
"could have been incorporated in the same chapter". The 
remedy of mechanics' and materialmen for the purpose of 
establishing liens on private construction. It, and the 
bond laws, as was pointed out by the Court, required that 
"certain affirmative actions must be taken to preserve and 
enforce the statutory claims thereunder within the represen-
tation period after the last material was furnished or labor 
performed". Thus, bonding privileges and the mechanics1 lien 
law have a cooperative effect and impact. 
In addition, all bond statutes contain the imposition 
of one year statutes of limitations. The Federal Miller Act 
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provides for a one year statute of limitations. The state 
law with reference to contractors' bonds and public contracts, 
found in Sections 14-1-1 to 14-1-12, U.C.A., 1953, as amended, 
provides for contractors'bonds on state projects much in the 
same fashion as the Miller Act provides for them on federal 
contracts, they too have a one year statute of limitations 
(See Section 14-1-6). Contractors' bonds in private contracts 
are governed by Sections 14-2-1 through 14-2-3, U.C.A., 1953, 
as amended. That statute also provides for the protection of 
laborers and materialmen, Section 14-1-1 sets out the bond 
conditions, and person to whom such bonds will run, and how 
a cause of action accrues under such a bond. Section 
14-2-2 creates a liability for a person who fails to obtain a 
bond. Section 14-2-2 goes on to say "actions to recover on 
liabilities shall be commenced within one year from the last 
date that the materials were furnished or the labor performed". 
Counsel for the appellant has argued, on pages 16 and 17 of 
his brief, that the limitation applies to an action for < 
failure to obtain a bond rather than to an action on a bond 
itself. However, the Utah Supreme Court has construed in 
1972, that sentence to apply to recovery under Section 14-2-1 
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as well. Thus, any recovery on a contractors1 bond under a 
private contract is governed by the one year statute of limi-
tations. The case so deciding was the case of Oscar E. Chytraus 
Company, Inc., vs. Wasatch Furnace and Electric, Inc., 28 Utah 
2d 338, 502 P.2d 554. In that case, the Court determined that 
the proper time limit for proceeding on an action against a 
bonding company was one year. In that case, the Court allowed 
the plaintiff to proceed against the United States Fidelity and 
Guarantee Company, which had issued a performance bond on a 
sub-contractor. The UMTA Credit Union contracted with Earl 
E. Walters to construct the building. Mr. Walters contracted 
with Wasatch Furnace and Electric, Inc., to provide for heat-
ing and air conditioning equipment. Oscar E. Chytraus Company 
sold the equipment to Wasatch Furnace and Electric, Inc., for 
installation in the project. In construing the statute, the 
Court rejected the claim of the United States Fidelity and 
Guarantee Company that it would reduce the time period for 
filing the claim against it below one year as Section 14-2-1 
did not specifically establish one. In that case Section 14-2-1 
was applied for the purpose of establishing the one year per-
iod. The Court in so doing stated as follows: 
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However, Section 14-2-2 U.C.A., 1953 
as amended provides that actions to re-
cover on such liability shall commence 
within one year from the dates the last 
labor was performed. That provision of 
the statute is controlling here and the 
terms of the bond which would attempt to 
restrict the period for the commencement 
of the action on the bond must be regarded 
surplusage. 
The plaintiff-appellant in this matter has argued, 
when discussing the application of the Miller Act, that the 
situation was not one concerned with federal law. Thereafter, 
it is argued, then analysing state provisions that it was 
not a state project but rather a federal project. Judge 
Croft, in his decision, rejected that logic. 
Judge Croft ruled as follows: 
It is my opinion that the fact that 
the bond required of Prince was by the 
general contract rather than by the "owner" 
of the land does not take the contract 
outside of the scope of Chapter 2, Title 
14, and that contractors, sureties, 
materialmen and laborers all are bound 
to meet the requirements of Section 14-2-1, 
et. seq. including that of commencing the 
action within one year from the date the 
last materials were furnished or the labor 
performed. (R. 75) 
The respondent Western Surety Company agrees with 
Judge Croft in his determination that, if state laws should 
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apply, the contractor here steps into the issues of an "owner". 
The Utah Supreme Court has had numerous occasions 
to review the one year time period provided for by Utah Bond 
Statutes and has never found them unreasonably short or harsh. 
See Day & NightHeating Company vs. Ruff, 19 Utah 2d 412, 
432 P.2d 43 (1967)j and Lister vs. Great American Insurance 
Company of Hew York, 26 Utah 2d 10, 484 P.2d 156 (1971). 
Indeed in the Lister case the Court applied a one year statute 
of limitations in a situation where the law provided that no 
limitation could be provided for a period of less than one 
year. 
The agreement between Tolman and Prince requiring 
the filing of the bond was a private contract. It included 
the requirement that a bond run in favor of Tolman and for 
his protection. The situation is clearly analogous and 
simular to that provided for in Section 14-2-1 U.C.A., 1953, 
as amended. That section speaks specifically and directly 
about the rights of materialmen and laborers to recover under 
such a bond for the materials furnished or laborers performed. 
The Utah Court has consistently recognized the nec-
essity of time requirements established by statutes. This has 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
been true even if they have effectuated a hardship on the party 
against whom they are being construed. See Scarborough vs. 
Granite School District, Utah, 531 P.2d 480 (1975). The 
Court has also realized the necessity of strictly adhering 
to such limitations in bonding situations. In the 1966 case 
of American Oil Company vs. General Contracting Corporation, 
17 Utah 2d 330, 411 P.2d 486, the Court strictly construed a 
90 day bonding notice requirement. In the 1973 case of Carlisle 
vs. Cox, supra, the Court strictly construed this precise 
section. That case involved the belated delivery of heat 
register units for a building project. The Court recognized 
that Sections 14-2-1 and 14-2-2 applied and barred the plain-
tiff's claim even though a minor portion of the materials sup-
plied by the plaintiff were supplied within the one year time 
period. 
This defendant submits that the one year statute of 
limitations fully applies and that the plaintiff in this action 
is barred for failure to bring it timely against this defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff-appellant in this action had a remedy 
under the Miller Act which he had failed to avail himself 
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( 
of. Since it failed to so act, Tolman, the general contractor, 
has no need for the indemnification provided for in the bond 
which is the subject of this suit. 
The plaintiff-appellant did not file its claim within 
one year. As such, it does not have a remedy against the con-
tractor of the contractor's surety under the Miller Act; nor 
does it have a cause of action against the surety of Clifford A. 
Prince (the Western Surety Company) under any other provision. 
Respondents contend that this action is not appro-
priately brought in the state courts. It further contends that 
if it is properly brought in the state courts the opinion 
of Judge Croft in ruling that the one year statute of limitations 
still applies i£ correct. Respondent respectfully requests 
that the opinion of Judge Croft in the Third Judicial District 
be affirmed. y 
Respectfully submitted this ^ ^ day of -itX*****^ , 1976 
J*+~ **• **~~ 
TIM DALTON DUNN 
HANSON, WADSWORTH & RUSSON 
702 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Respondent 
Western Surety Company 
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